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ABSTRACT 
 
Currently, very limited research is available to help researchers and firms understand the 
behavior of hackers.  As a result, misconceptions about hackers are formed based on lack of 
understanding about technology and failure in recognizing the differences among hackers.  We 
use addiction, intrinsic motivation (state), and self-monitoring (trait) theories to explain hacking.   
We obtained 62 usable responses from hackers who completed our online research instrument.  
Our findings showed that intrinsically motivated hackers were less discouraged by the possibility 
of being discovered and the rules imposed by regulatory authorities; however, no significant 
result was reported for rules imposed by the profession.  Individuals with high motivation to hack 
were found to be less discouraged by all three deterrence measures.  Participants who perceived 
hacking to be more consistent with their internal cues were less discouraged by the possibility of 
being discovered and the rules imposed by regulatory authorities; however, no significant 
difference was found for rules imposed by the profession.  Finally, contrary to our expectation, 
low self-monitors were more discouraged by all three deterrence measures than high self-
monitors.  Additional research is needed to provide insight into this finding. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
he Department of Justice defines computer crimes as “any violations of criminal law that involve 
knowledge of computer technology for their perpetration, investigation, or prosecution” (Benson et al. 
1997).  Hacking, in particular, is defined as “the process of accessing computer systems by persons 
who have no legitimate access to the systems” in Computer Misuse Executive Briefing (1990) by Coopers and 
Lybrand Deloitte (Mulhull 1999).  Hacking can undermine the fundamentals of financial systems by exposing the 
flaws in these systems.  Poorly designed systems are susceptible to security breaches that can compromise the quality 
of financial and operational information that resides on these systems.  Decision makers who use information 
compromised by breaches may face adverse economic consequences such as impaired reputation, higher costs to 
detect or correct the breaches, and potential legal liability (Campbell et al. forthcoming).  A survey of 500 U.S. 
companies by the Computer Security Institute (CSI) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) indicated an increase 
in reported financial losses of 21 percent (or $456 million) for 2002; mostly a result of organized, planned cyber-
attacks (Farber 2003).  TruSecure, a security firm, found that a company suffered an average loss of $475,000 as a 
result of the Blaster Worm infection (Varghese 2003). 
 
 The information age has created an environment whereby information is a key asset and information security 
is a strategic variable that helps firms gain a competitive advantage (Gordon et al. forthcoming).  Recognition of the 
role of IT and its accompanying budgetary demands for compliance with regulatory requirements is critical in 
maintaining a firm’s competitiveness.  An annual survey revealed that 40% of the chief financial officers polled 
believed that compliance with the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) would not affect their IT budget 
(Gates 2003).  This belief illustrates a disconnection between chief financial officers and chief information officers 
(Gates 2003).  Besides chief executive officers and chief financial officers, chief information officers are also affected 
by SOA because assurance of compliance is provided by the systems that contain the financial information (Imhoff 
2004).  Firms are expected to increase spending to comply with the requirements of SOA.  AMR Research projected 
that firms would spend about $5.5 billion in 2004 to comply with SOA (www.dmreview.com).  Software packages 
(e.g., IDS Scheer’s ARIS Sarbanes-Oxley Audit Manager, Preventsys Network Audit and Policy Assurance System, 
T 
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HandySoft’s Sarbanes-Oxley Accelerator, SAP Compliance Management for Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SAS Corporate 
Compliance for Sarbanes-Oxley, and Vignette V7) are now available to help firms achieve compliance with SOA.   
 
 Computer Insider, a newsletter for hackers, estimated that about 900 hackers were hired during the past few 
years by organizations that they once targeted.  For instance, after a hacker successfully created a negative balance in 
a German bank account, he received job offers from several German companies desperate for his expertise in beefing 
up their security systems from external threats (Cushing 2001).  A survey conducted by CSI/FBI showed that 68% of 
the security professionals indicated that they would not hire reformed hackers, 15% said they would, and 17% were 
unsure.  In a survey of IT professionals, white hat hackers who hacked for intrinsic reasons and reformed hackers who 
hacked for extrinsic reasons were reported to be more likely to be hired (Chan and Yao forthcoming).  “White hat” 
hackers conduct penetration tests to identify system vulnerabilities and inform the owners of these problems (Cushing, 
2001).  These individuals are likely former hackers who have moved on to become security professionals (Thomas 
2002).  A reformed hacker is one who no longer hacks to exploit for personal gains (Chan and Yao forthcoming).   
 
 The question of whether former hackers should be hired is a controversial one.  Firms may not hire former 
hackers because they are cautious of potential problems that may arise from hiring such individuals.  Some firms 
prefer to play it safe than to risk hiring former hackers.  Although preventive controls such as background checks are 
desirable in the hiring process, it is difficult to determine whether the former hackers are truly reformed and that they 
would not engage in activities to hack the systems of their prospective employers.  A government agency hired a 
hacker to do research on its vulnerabilities but fired him later when he reported only one or two vulnerabilities each 
week and made these vulnerabilities known to his friends (Business Wire 2000).  In another instance, upon 
interviewing a former hacker, a company found that the hacker still possessed a strong hacker mentality and had no 
choice but to disqualify him from further consideration for a job (Callaway 1996).  On the other hand, it is possible 
that some hackers are reformed.  For example, “Kuji”, a former hacker, worked as a security consultant and was 
selected to head the marketing campaigns of some reputable companies (Cushing 2001).  Another reformed hacker 
became a chief security officer of a security products company in Westboro (Weinstein 2002).  Some believe that it 
takes a thief to catch a thief and that it may be appropriate to use a reformed hacker to simulate an attack (Bennett 
2002).  Thus, firms may hire hackers as part of their regular security control teams to combat information security 
breaches.  Negative perceptions of hackers may be mitigated if these individuals can be reformed to assume the 
position of systems security officers and be assimilated into the firms’ security control teams.  Assimilation of 
reformed hackers into the workplace environment may increase the awareness of employees on the economic 
consequences of systems security breaches on business operations.   
 
 Law enforcement officials may be intimidated by hackers because they find technology too complicated to 
understand and the relationship between technology and punishment too difficult to discern (Thomas 2002).  The 
paucity of research on hacking behavior impairs the ability of the judicial system in meting out effective deterrence 
measures for discouraging malicious attacks.  The intentions of the perpetrators and the resultant damage or harm that 
they cause to a system or organization should be considered so that appropriate punishment can be imposed to deter 
malicious attacks.  These actions may mitigate any misconceptions about unfair treatment of the perpetrators.
1
  
Knowledge of technology is what separates hackers from typical computer users and this increasingly wide gap poses 
a tremendous threat to security (Thomas 2002).  People treat technology with hostility when systems are not perceived 
to be user friendly; as a result, expertise, control, and knowledge are needed for managing technology.  Users’ lack of 
understanding of technology contributes to their sense of helplessness with technology and this provides hackers with 
the opportunity to exert their authority with respect to their mastery and expertise in technology.  This authority figure 
is usually a male because males dominate the computer industry.  A layperson’s lack of knowledge about technology 
leads to misconstrued conceptions about hackers and hacking.
2
  Indeed, the media play a significant role in 
                                                 
1 The hacking community expressed their outrage when they thought that the punishment imposed on Kevin Mitnick was harsh. 
2 A layperson’s discomfort with her lack of knowledge of technology is demonstrated by our difficulty in getting this research study approved by a 
university’s institutional review board.  This research underwent three full board reviews over a period of several months.  The first author had to 
attend the first meeting to explain the research to the board.  A computer science faculty was asked to serve on the board as an adviser.  We were 
not allowed to use our universities’ systems.  We were told to make sure that all identifying information that linked us to our respective universities 
be removed from our instrument housed at a website rented from an external web hosting company.  We were not supposed to use our universities’ 
email accounts.  Instead, we had to set up email accounts with hotmail.com without identifying information that would link us to our respective 
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contributing to the misconceptions that the general public has about hackers.  For example, the media portrayed Kevin 
Mitnick as a dangerous criminal and a “darkside hacker” despite the fact that no financial gains or damage to 
computer systems, files, or codes resulted from his hacking.  Although these stories were later retracted, the labels 
attached to Mitnick stuck and had a lasting impact on his life (Thomas 2002).  Thus, the stories that the media tell the 
public have a tremendous impact on their impression about hackers in general. 
 
 Prior research (e.g., Gordon and Loeb 2002; Gordon et al. forthcoming; Campbell et al. forthcoming) has 
examined the impact of systems security on the accounting, financial, and economic sectors.  Using economics as a 
framework, these studies looked at variables such as the economic cost of publicly announced information security 
breaches and return on investment in information security.  The market reacted negatively to security breaches 
involving unauthorized access to confidential information; however, no market reaction was reported for breaches that 
did not involve confidential information (Campbell et al. forthcoming).  These findings suggest that the economic 
consequences of a security breach vary in accordance with the nature of the assets compromised by the breach 
(Campbell et al. forthcoming).  Since substantial amounts of money are invested in information security activities, it is 
not surprising that chief financial officers are demanding a rational approach to such expenditures.  This includes 
increased adoption of return on security investments as a measure to capture the cost-beneficial aspect of information 
security (Gordon and Loeb 2002).  Although security systems may be effective at preventing security breaches with 
severe economic consequences, the breaches that do occur are often nuisances with inconsequential economic impact 
on firms (Anders 2000; Smith 2000).  Thus, it may be rational to take a “wait-and-see” approach toward spending 
some of the funds earmarked for information security because of the uncertain occurrence of security breaches 
(Gordon et al. forthcoming).  This reactive, as opposed to proactive, approach toward a significant portion of 
information security expenditures is consistent with the capital investment decisions frequently made by management.  
We contribute to the stream of research developed by Gordon and Loeb and their colleagues by examining the 
systems security problem from a behavioral perspective.  The paucity of research on the behavior of a hacker may 
explain why the tremendous amount of resources committed to contain the hacking problem has resulted in somewhat 
little success.  
 
 The objectives of our study are to increase understanding on the behaviors of hackers by examining hacking 
as a state and trait, and to provide insight into whether deterrence measures would discourage hacking.  We use 
addiction, intrinsic motivation (state), and self-monitoring (trait) theories to explain hacking.  Addiction theory 
provides a framework for understanding the behaviors of hackers.  We consider hacking as an addictive behavior 
because the interviews conducted by Thomas (2002) and Verton (2002) suggest that hackers are so engrossed in the 
activity that they frequently stay up all night to hack.  These individuals indicated that they hacked for the sake of 
interest/enjoyment.  Thus, we believe that it is appropriate to use intrinsic motivation theory to facilitate understanding 
on the hacking behavior.  Intrinsic motivation is a state variable because it varies with respect to the type of activity or 
over a period of time.  Since intrinsically motivated individuals hack for the sake of interest/enjoyment, deterrence 
measures such as the possibility of being discovered, and the rules imposed by regulatory authorities or the profession 
may not deter hacking.  The positive affect
3
 derived from interest/enjoyment in hacking may outweigh the negative 
affect associated with the deterrence measures.  In addition, we modified the Perception of Task Value scale 
(developed by Eccles et al. 1983) to obtain a perception of hacking scale to measure a person’s motivation to hack.  In 
particular, we examine whether individuals with a high motivation to hack would be more discouraged by the 
deterrence measures than those with a low motivation to hack.  Our perception of hacking scale (i.e., motivation to 
hack construct) includes four components:  interest, importance, utility, and opportunity cost.  The interest component 
is similar to the intrinsic motivation factor (i.e., interest/enjoyment).  The purpose of our perception of hacking scale is 
to address the strength and intensity of the combined factors (i.e., interest, importance, utility, and opportunity cost) on 
the effectiveness of the deterrence measures in discouraging hacking.  Finally, we use self-monitoring theory to 
provide insight into the individual characteristics of hackers.  We use the self-monitoring scale (Snyder 1974, 1979, 
1987) to classify our hacker participants into two categories:  high or low self-monitors, and investigate whether the 
deterrence measures are effective at discouraging hackers with different personality traits. 
                                                                                                                                                                
universities.  We were specifically instructed to print out, not forward via email, any emails received from our hacker participants to an 
administrator on the board. 
3 Affect is defined as our “liking, disliking, preference, evaluation, or the experience of pleasure or displeasure” (Zajonc 1980, p. 151). 
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 The next section discusses the theoretical framework and the hypotheses posed in our study.  The third 
section explains the research method used to address our hypotheses.  The statistical results are presented in the fourth 
section.  Finally, the contributions and limitations of our study, and suggestions for future research are discussed. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 Using addiction theory as a framework, we examine hacking both as a state (intrinsic motivation) and trait 
(self-monitoring) to facilitate understanding on the behaviors of hackers.  Intrinsic motivation and self-monitoring 
theories propose that internal (values, beliefs, and self-image) or external cues (recognition of achievements by and 
identification with social groups, financial incentives, or prestige) may impact a person’s motivation to hack.  
Although individuals may experience interest or enjoyment in the performance of a specific activity (e.g., hacking), 
they may not perceive performance of activities in general to be interesting or enjoyable.  Personality trait can help 
explain a person’s predisposition or attitude toward an activity such as hacking. 
 
Addiction Theory 
 
 Addicts lack self-identity and inner stability; therefore, they are prone to extreme experiences ranging from 
rigid self-control to total lack of control (Hirschman 1992).  Addicts may possess an emotionally inadequate self and a 
false identity in early childhood, and may view addictive behaviors as essential to their daily functioning (Hirschman 
1992).  As a result, they may become dependent on frequently performed activities for intrinsic (i.e., interest or 
enjoyment) or extrinsic (i.e., recognition of achievements by and identification with social groups, financial 
incentives, or prestige) reasons.  Addictive behaviors are difficult to change because they are performed frequently 
and automatically, and are habitual in nature (Tomer 2001).  Addicts feel controlled by the commodity or activity 
because they treat the commodity or activity as the underlying reason for their existence (Tomer 2001).   
 
 We use addiction theory as a framework for explaining the behavior of hackers.  We view hacking as an 
addictive behavior.  This contention can be supported by the judicial system’s treatment of hacking as a case of 
“substance abuse” (Thomas 2002).  Indeed, one hacker described hacking as an obsessive behavior (Thomas 2002).  
Most hackers turn to hacking during their early adolescent years as a means to avoid problems at home or at school 
(Verton 2002).  These individuals spend countless number of hours hacking because they not only derive interest or 
enjoyment from engaging in the act but also feel a sense of superiority in their ability to exercise control over the 
computer (Verton 2002).  Addictive behaviors are compulsive and addicts experience craving for the given 
commodity or activity (Tomer 2001).  It is difficult to deter addictive behaviors such as hacking.  To counteract this 
problem, judges impose penalties that restrict hackers from accessing telephones, computers, and modems (Thomas 
2002).  In general, deterrence measures are imposed to discourage individuals from performing acts that are either 
socially undesirable or criminal in nature.  However, limited research is available to help us understand circumstances 
where these deterrence measures will not be effective in deterring such acts. 
 
Intrinsic Motivation 
 
 One’s inherent motivation to perform an activity is considered an intrinsic motivation.  In contrast to 
extrinsic motivation such as monetary reward, intrinsic motivation exists when an activity satisfies a person’s need for 
competence and control (e.g., Lepper and Henderlong 2000; Ryan and Deci 2000).  Intrinsic motivation occurs when 
“individuals are motivated to experience interest and … that a variety of goals may be associated with interest for 
different people and/or in different contexts” (Sansone and Smith 2000, p. 445).  Individuals experience interest when 
their needs and desires are integrated with the activity.  From this perspective, interest is the driving mechanism for all 
actions, including cognitive activity (Piaget 1981).  In other words, an individual is said to be experientially interested 
when a certain quality of attention and sense of delight is present.  Interest leads to the performance of intrinsically 
motivated behaviors (Deci 1998).   
 
 Intrinsic motivation has been examined as an outcome of an activity (i.e., a dependent variable) or as a 
process of engagement in the activity (i.e., an independent variable that predicts some dependent variable such as 
performance) (Sansone and Harackiewicz 2000).  We examine intrinsic motivation (i.e., interest/enjoyment) as a 
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process of engagement in an activity where intrinsic motivation determines whether hackers who hack for the sake of 
interest/enjoyment would be discouraged by deterrence measures. 
 
Motivation to Hack (Perception of Hacking Scale) 
 
 The motivation to hack construct is derived from motivation theory.  We modified the Perception of Task 
Value scale (developed by Eccles et al., 1983) to obtain the perception of hacking scale to measure a person’s 
motivation to hack.  The value components of a person’s motivation in a task include her goals for the task and beliefs 
about the importance, utility or interest of the task (Pintrich and De Groot 1990).  These components can influence the 
strength or intensity of a behavior (Pintrich and Schrauben 1992).  An individual’s needs, goals, or values can interact 
with the characteristics of a task to determine the value of a task (Eccles et al. 1983).  The four components of task 
value are:  interest, importance, utility, and opportunity cost.
4
  The interest factor is discussed in the section on 
intrinsic motivation.  The importance value refers to how important it is for a person to perform well in a task (Eccles 
et al. 1983).  Importance is also related to the relevance of engaging in an activity to either confirm or disconfirm 
salient features of actual or ideal self-schema (Wigfield and Eccles 1992).  The utility value pertains to a person’s 
perceived usefulness of the task in attaining specific goals (e.g., career prospects or outperforming others) (Pintrich 
and Schrauben 1992).  The opportunity cost of a task refers to the time lost for engaging in other valued alternatives 
(Eccles et al. 1983).   
 
 We theorize that motivation to hack is high when an activity is perceived to be high in interest, importance or 
utility, or the opportunity cost of engaging in the activity is low.  In contrast, motivation to hack is low when the 
activity is perceived to be low in interest, importance or utility, or the opportunity cost of engaging in the activity is 
high. 
 
Self-monitoring Theory 
 
 Snyder’s self-monitoring scale classifies individuals into two groups; namely, high and low self-monitors.  
Individuals with relatively high scores on the scale are classified as high self-monitors while individuals with 
relatively low scores are classified as low self-monitors.  High self-monitors are concerned about how others perceive 
their behavior in various social contexts, as such they are adept at adjusting their behavior in accordance with 
situational appropriateness.  High self-monitors may engage in an activity for extrinsic reasons such as recognition of 
their achievements by and identification with their social groups, financial incentives, or prestige.  Low self-monitors 
are less likely to modify their behaviors to satisfy situational demands.  They are more likely to act in accordance with 
relevant inner sources and are concerned about whether their behaviors in social contexts accurately reflect their 
underlying values, beliefs, and self-image.  Consistent with self-monitoring theory, we predict that high self-monitors 
may hack for extrinsic reasons (i.e., recognition of their achievements by and identification with their social groups, 
financial incentives, or prestige) and low self-monitors may hack for intrinsic reasons (i.e., their underlying values, 
beliefs, and self-image). 
 
Hypotheses 
 
 Behaviors are said to be intrinsically motivated when individuals experience interest/enjoyment in the 
performance of an activity (Deci 1992).  Intrinsically motivated individuals receive their rewards in the form of the 
affective or cognitive experiences that accompany their behavior.  We theorize that individuals may engage in hacking 
for the sake of interest/enjoyment.  For example, one hacker indicated that he hacked because of the thrill and 
enjoyment that he derived from engaging in such an activity (Mulhall 1999).  Support for our contention that hacking 
is an intrinsically motivated behavior can be found in the material of Eric Steven Raymond who defined the hacker 
attitude as a belief that hacking motivated the individual and facilitated learning (www.catb.org/~esr/faqs).  Raymond 
also identified boredom and drudgery as impediments to the interest/enjoyment that individuals derived from hacking.  
A person’s experience of interest during task performance can be a primary motivator for her continued performance 
                                                 
4 Although these components can be differentiated, it is not easy to distinguish their relations (Jacobs and Eccles 2000).  The correlations among 
interest, importance, and utility ranged from 0.51 and 0.79 in a sample of adolescents (Eccles and Wigfield 1995).   
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(Sansone, Wiebe, and Morgan 1999).  To our knowledge, empirical research has not been conducted to examine 
hacking as an intrinsically motivated behavior or to address the question of whether deterrence measures would 
discourage hacking.  Since intrinsically motivated behaviors are performed for the sake of interest/enjoyment, 
deterrence measures such as the likelihood that the activity is discovered and the rules imposed by regulatory 
authorities or by the profession may not discourage hacking.  This leads to the first set of hypotheses:  
 
H1a: Compared to non-intrinsically motivated individuals, intrinsically motivated individuals are less discouraged 
by the possibility of being discovered. 
H1b: Compared to non-intrinsically motivated individuals, intrinsically motivated individuals are less discouraged 
by the rules imposed by regulatory authorities. 
H1c: Compared to non-intrinsically motivated individuals, intrinsically motivated individuals are less discouraged 
by the rules imposed by their profession. 
 
 Along a similar line of reasoning put forth in the first set of hypotheses, we theorize that individuals with a 
high motivation to hack would be less discouraged by deterrence measures such as the possibility of being 
discovered and the rules imposed by regulatory authorities and by their profession than individuals with a low 
motivation to hack.  Thus, 
 
H2a: Compared to individuals with a low motivation to hack, individuals with a high motivation to hack are less 
discouraged by the possibility of being discovered. 
H2b: Compared to individuals with a low motivation to hack, individuals with a high motivation to hack are less 
discouraged by the rules imposed by regulatory authorities. 
H2c: Compared to individuals with a low motivation to hack, individuals with a high motivation to hack are less 
discouraged by the rules imposed by their profession. 
 
 In addition, we examine hacking as a personality trait.  We use the self-monitoring scale developed by 
Snyder (1974, 1979, 1987) to classify individuals into two groups:  high or low self-monitors.  We propose that high 
self-monitors may hack because of external cues such as recognition of their achievements by and identification with 
the hacking community, financial incentives, or prestige.
5
  If these external cues are removed, the deterrence measures 
may discourage high self-monitors from hacking.  In contrast, low self-monitors may act in accordance with internal 
cues such as their underlying values, beliefs, and self-image.  They perceive their rewards in terms of expression of 
attributes associated with their egos.  They may not perceive monetary rewards or social recognition to be as valuable 
as the reward that they receive from their ability in establishing their self-identity and confirmation of the notion of the 
kind of people they perceive themselves to be (Katz 1960).  These individuals believe that hacking establishes or 
confirms their underlying values, beliefs, and self-image.  Thus, low self-monitors are unlikely to be discouraged by 
deterrence measures.  This leads to the third set of hypotheses: 
 
H3a: Compared to high self-monitors, low self-monitors are less discouraged by the possibility of being 
discovered. 
H3b: Compared to high self-monitors, low self-monitors are less discouraged by the rules imposed by regulatory 
authorities. 
H3c: Compared to high self-monitors, low self-monitors are less discouraged by the rules imposed by their 
profession. 
 
 We feel that it is necessary to conduct separate tests on the impact of a hacker’s underlying values, beliefs, 
and self-image (i.e., internal cues) on the effectiveness of deterrence measures.  The purpose of these tests is to 
provide additional insight into the findings obtained in hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c.  Finally, 
 
H4a: Compared to individuals who perceive hacking to be less consistent with their internal cues, individuals who 
perceive hacking to be more consistent with their internal cues are less discouraged by the possibility of being 
discovered. 
                                                 
5 These factors are examples of extrinsic motivation.  Since we were not aware of any prior empirical study that examined the behaviors of hackers, 
we were unable to determine beforehand if our sample would include individuals who hacked because of their extrinsic motivation. 
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H4b: Compared to individuals who perceive hacking to be less consistent with their internal cues, individuals who 
perceive hacking to be more consistent with their internal cues are less discouraged by the rules imposed by 
regulatory authorities. 
H4c: Compared to individuals who perceive hacking to be less consistent with their internal cues, individuals who 
perceive hacking to be more consistent with their internal cues are less discouraged by the rules imposed by 
their profession. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Procedures 
 
 One of the authors approached his contacts (most likely hackers) for help in recruiting hackers for our study.
6
  
These contacts were requested to make our website address and password known to the hacking community.  The 
purpose of the password was to prevent non-target participants (i.e., those who were not hackers) from accessing and 
completing our online research instrument.
7
  The media that the contacts used to make our website address and 
password known to the hacking community were undisclosed.  We speculate that the contacts might have used the 
Internet Relay Chat to broadcast our study to the hacking underground.
8
  Our research instrument was housed at a 
website rented from an external web hosting company and our data were stored on the university’s network of the first 
author.  We felt that it was necessary to store our data on a secured university’s network.  Codes were written to 
protect the anonymity of the university’s network system and to minimize potential tampering of our data.  Our web 
developer monitored our data for potential hacking activity.  He did not find any hacking activity throughout the entire 
duration of our study.  The first author also accessed our website regularly during the entire period that our research 
instrument was online to ensure that it was working properly and that our data were not hacked or tampered with.  Our 
website was not defaced or hacked throughout the entire period that it was online. 
 
Research Instrument 
 
 An overview of our study appeared on the first page of our website.  Participants were required to enter a 
password for accessing our research instrument.  They were assured of their confidentiality with respect to their 
participation in our study.  Specifically, participants were informed that their IP addresses would not be tracked and 
that all log files would be destroyed.
9
  We provided our hotmail accounts (without any identifying information that 
linked us to our university affiliations) so that participants could express their concerns or problems with the way that 
our study was conducted.  Our research instrument
10
 consisted of three sections and the estimated completion time 
was 30 minutes.  The first section contained an 18-item self-monitoring scale.  A series of questions pertaining to 
hacking were found in the second section and the final section collected the participants’ demographics information.  
At the end of the experiment, participants were thanked for their participation and asked to provide their mailing 
addresses if they wished to receive their incentive payment of $10.
11
  They were assured that their mailing addresses 
                                                 
6 The books written by Verton (2002) and Thomas (2002) are based on interviews conducted with some hackers.  However, these authors seemed to 
be associated with the media.  It is extremely difficult to obtain hacker subjects because of the unique nature of their activity and the legal 
implications of hacking.  Thus, we believe that it is appropriate to approach one of the authors’ contacts to obtain participants for our study. 
7 An individual who hacked to gain access to our website and complete our online instrument would be an appropriate participant for our study. 
8 Unexpectedly, the first author managed to come into contact with a hacker when her identity and affiliation with a university were discovered.  
We suspected that the hacker might have obtained her personal data from the website where she registered the domain name for our study; i.e., 
www.academia-research.com.  The hacker told the first author that our website would be defaced or hacked if our study were not for research 
purposes.  She engaged in several email communications with the hacker.  Eventually, she managed to convince the hacker to help her complete our 
research instrument and recruit participants for our study.   
9 Since the second author was out of jurisdiction, the web developer downloaded the data from the university’s network and sent the data file 
(without the IP addresses and log files) to the second author.  The second author deleted the participants’ mailing addresses from the data file after 
he mailed the incentive payments to the participants.  He then sent the data file (without the participants’ mailing addresses) to the first author for 
analysis. 
10 A web developer at a university put the instrument online and wrote the code for collecting the data.  He complied with the requirements of the 
institutional review board in ensuring the anonymity of the university.  We pretested our instrument with some graduate students at a university.  
Valuable comments were also received from faculty members at a university. 
11 Motivation researchers are careful in their administration of incentive payments because of their impact on intrinsic motivation.  Since we used an 
incentive payment that was non task-contingent in nature, it should not have an impact on intrinsic motivation.  Our t test results show that incentive 
payment did not have an impact on our dependent variables.  
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would be destroyed after payment was sent.  Some participants provided their email addresses instead of their mailing 
addresses.  One of the authors checked with them via email if they wished to receive their incentive payment.  Two 
participants declined payment.
12
 
 
Participants 
 
 Seventy-six participants completed our online research instrument.  Fourteen individuals indicated that they 
had not hacked previously.  As such, their data were excluded from analysis
13
, resulting in 62 usable responses:  46 
males and 16 females.  Participants’ ages ranged from 17 to 45 and their mean age is 27.  74% of the participants were 
employed and 26% were unemployed.  11% had less than a high school education, 40% had a high school diploma, 
31% had a bachelor’s degree, 11% had a master’s degree, and 7% had a doctoral degree.  The two major cultural 
groups are Asians (71%) and Caucasians (21%).  Participants’ professional certifications include application 
development (34%), communications (21%), database (27%), hardware (21%), help desk (18%), Internet/Web (31%), 
networking (29%), operating system (31%), and security (21%). 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
 We operationalized our independent and dependent variables via a series of questions in our research 
instrument.  Exhibit 1 shows how these variables are measured via the participants’ responses to the questions. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Interest/Enjoyment 
 
 The interest/enjoyment variable has two levels; that is, the participants either hacked or did not hack for the 
sake of interest/enjoyment.  Participants checked their responses to the following question:  Why do you continue to 
engage in hacking?  Those who checked the interest/enjoyment option were assumed to hack for the sake of 
interest/enjoyment.  Participants who did not check this option were not assumed to hack for interest/enjoyment. 
 
Motivation to Hack 
 
 The original Perception of Task Value scale has two items in each of the interest, importance, utility, and 
opportunity cost subscales.  We decided to include only one item in our utility subscale because it would be redundant 
to include two items in this subscale.  We found that one measure of interest and one measure of opportunity cost 
were significantly correlated with each other but not significantly correlated with the remaining items in the subscales.  
As such, we excluded these two items from the perception of hacking scale.  The correlation coefficients for the 
remaining five items range from 0.43 to 0.85 (p=0.000).  The reliability coefficient alpha for these five items is 0.90.  
The motivation to hack construct was obtained by averaging each participant’s responses to the five items in the 
perception of hacking scale.  Table 1 presents the reliability analysis of the five items in the perception of hacking 
scale. 
 
Self-monitoring Scale 
 
 Participants were split into two groups based on their scores on the 18-item self-monitoring scale.  The more 
extreme selection criteria of upper and lower quartiles (scores of 13 and above and 7 and below respectively) can be 
used to increase the purity of the class samples
14
 (Synder 1987).  Using the more extreme selection criteria as a 
guideline for classifying the sample, our participants’ scores on the self-monitoring scale are as follows:  17 scored 7 
or below, 15 scored 13 or above, and 30 scored between 8 and 12.  We decided to depart slightly from the more 
extreme selection criteria by classifying participants with scores of 7 or below as low self-monitors and those with 
                                                 
12 One of the authors received emails from some participants.  These emails were positive in that they addressed the value of our research. 
13 This action was necessary despite the fact that it actually weakened the results of our study. 
14 Scores of 10 or 11 can be used to split the participants into two groups.  Those who scored 10 or below on the self-monitoring scale were 
classified as low self-monitors and those who scored 10 or above on the scale were categorized as high self-monitors (Gangestad and Synder 1985).   
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scores of 8 or above as high self-monitors.  This decision was made so that 30 participants who scored between 8 and 
12 can be classified.
15
   
 
 
Exhibit 1 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Interest/Enjoyment 
Why do you continue to engage in hacking?  (Yes=checked, No= not checked) 
 
Motivation to Hack (Perception of Hacking Scale) 
1. In general, I find hacking (very boring…..very interesting) 
2. I feel that being good at hacking is (not at all important…..very important) 
3. How important is it for you to do well at hacking?  (not at all important…..very important) 
4. How useful to you is hacking?  (not at all useful…..very useful) 
5. How much does the time you spend on hacking keep you from doing other things you would like to do?  (takes away no 
time…..takes away a lot of time) 
*Measured on a 7-point scale.  The opportunity cost component is reverse scored. 
 
Internal Cues 
1. Do you believe that hacking is consistent with your underlying values?   
2. Do you believe that hacking is consistent with your underlying beliefs?   
3. Do you believe that hacking enhances your self-image?   
*Measured on a 7-point scale with 1=not at all and 7=to a great extent 
 
Self-monitoring Scale 
1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.   
2. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like.   
3. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe.   
4. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information.   
5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.   
6. I would probably make a good actor.   
7. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.   
8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons. 
9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.   
10. I am not always the person I appear to be.   
11. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or win their favor.   
12. I have considered being an entertainer.   
13. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.   
14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations. 
15. At a party I let others keep jokes and stories going.   
16. I feel awkward in company and do not show up quite as well as I should.   
17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end). 
18. I may deceive people by being friendly when I dislike them. 
*Participants indicated their responses to each question in the self-monitoring scale by selecting either the True or False option.  
The questions were keyed in the high self-monitoring direction. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Deterrence Measures 
1. How likely will the possibility of being discovered discourage you from hacking?   
2. How likely will the rules imposed by your profession discourage you from hacking?   
3. How likely will the rules imposed by regulatory authorities discourage you from hacking?   
*Measured on a 7-point scale with 1=not likely and 7=very likely 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Since the self-monitoring theory does not suggest a middle group, we did not create a middle group for comparison purposes. 
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Table 1: Reliability Analysis of Perception of Hacking Scale 
 
Item Mean Std Dev 
INT2 4.7581 1.8703 
IMP1 4.0968 2.1555 
IMP2 3.6935 2.1923 
USEFUL 3.6452 2.0890 
TIME1 4.4194 2.1313 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 INT2 IMP1 IMP2 USEFUL TIME1 
INT2 1.0000     
IMP1 0.5427 1.0000    
IMP2 0.4494 0.7592 1.0000   
USEFUL 0.4308 0.7432 0.8457 1.0000  
TIME1 0.7867 0.6369 0.6525 0.6231 1.0000 
*The correlation coefficients for all five items are significant at p=0.000.  The reliability coefficient alpha for these items is 0.90. 
 
Label Description of Item 
INT2: In general, I find hacking (very boring…..very interesting) 
IMP1: I feel that being good at hacking is (not at all important…..very important) 
IMP2: How important is it for you to do well at hacking?  (not at all important…..very important) 
USEFUL: How useful to you is hacking?  (not at all useful…..very useful) 
TIME1: 
*How much does the time you spend on hacking keep you from doing other things you would like to do?  
(takes away no time…..takes away a lot of time) 
* Reverse scored 
 
 
Internal Cues 
 
 The internal cues construct consists of three measures:  values, beliefs, and self-image.  The correlation 
coefficients for these measures range from 0.41 to 0.90 (p=0.000 or 0.001).  The reliability coefficient alpha for the 
items is 0.81.  The internal cues construct was derived by averaging each participant’s responses to each of the items.  
Table 2 shows the reliability analysis of the three measures in the internal cues construct. 
 
 
Table 2: Reliability Analysis of Internal Cues Construct 
 
Item Mean Std Dev 
VALUES 3.4355 2.0295 
BELIEFS 3.3871 2.1831 
IMAGE 2.5484 1.5647 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 VALUES BELIEFS IMAGE 
    
VALUES 1.0000   
BELIEFS 0.9012 1.0000  
IMAGE 0.4243 0.4072 1.0000 
 
*The correlation coefficients for the three items are significant at p=0.000 or p=0.001.  The reliability coefficient alpha for these items 
is 0.81. 
 
Label Description of Item 
VALUES: Do you believe that hacking is consistent with your underlying values? 
BELIEFS: Do you believe that hacking is consistent with your underlying beliefs? 
IMAGE: Do you believe that hacking enhances your self-image? 
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Dependent Variables 
 
Deterrence Measures 
 
 The deterrence measures were obtained separately via the participants’ responses to each of the following 
three questions (on a 7-point scale with 1=not likely and 7=very likely): 
 
1. How likely will the possibility of being discovered discourage you from hacking?   
2. How likely will the rules imposed by your profession discourage you from hacking?  
3. How likely will the rules imposed by regulatory authorities discourage you from hacking? 
 
Results 
 
 ANOVA was used to test hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, 3a, 3b, and 3c.  Since the independent variables for 
hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, 4a, 4b, and 4c are continuous in nature, regression was used to test these hypotheses.  The 
results are found in Table 3.  Hypothesis 1 proposes that intrinsically motivated individuals are less discouraged by 
deterrence measures such as the possibility of being discovered and the rules imposed by regulatory authorities and by 
their profession.  We found that intrinsically motivated individuals were less discouraged by the possibility of being 
discovered (p=0.000) and by the rules imposed by regulatory authorities (p=0.017); however, no significant difference 
was reported for rules imposed by the profession.  Thus, hypotheses 1a and 1b are supported but hypothesis 1c is not 
supported.  The insignificant result obtained in hypothesis 1c could be attributed to our participants’ definition of the 
term “profession”.  Our participants may consider the hacking community as their profession and think that the 
hacking community would not impose rules to deter hacking.  Hypothesis 2 states that participants with high 
motivation to hack are less discouraged by the possibility of being discovered and the rules imposed by regulatory 
authorities and by their profession.  This hypothesis is supported at p=0.000 for all three deterrence measures.  The 
results for hypothesis 3 are opposite to what we have expected.  Low self-monitors were more discouraged by the 
likelihood of being discovered (p=0.002), and the rules imposed by regulatory authorities (p=0.021) and by their 
profession (p=0.000).
16
  These findings contradict self-monitoring theory.  This can be attributed to the unique nature 
of our participants and the hacking activity, and the diverse cultural background of our participants.
17
  Hypothesis 4 
examines whether individuals who feel that hacking is more consistent with their internal cues are less discouraged by 
the possibility of being discovered and the rules imposed by regulatory authorities and by their profession.  We found 
that participants who felt that hacking was more consistent with their internal cues were less discouraged by the 
likelihood of being discovered (p=0.004) and by the rules imposed by regulatory authorities (p=0.045); however, no 
significant difference was reported for rules imposed by the profession.  Thus, hypotheses 4a and 4b are supported but 
hypothesis 4c is not supported.  The insignificant result obtained in hypothesis 4c could be explained by a similar 
reasoning process suggested in hypothesis 1c.  Specifically, participants may feel that the hacking community; that is, 
their profession, would not impose rules to deter hacking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Use of the extreme selection criteria led to significant results for possibility of being discovered (p=0.00) and rules imposed by the hackers’ 
profession (p=0.03), and marginally significant result (p=0.10) for rules imposed by regulatory authorities.  
17 A colleague offered another potential explanation for the opposite results obtained in hypothesis 3.  Low self-monitors may overreact to external 
cues because they normally would not pay attention to these cues.  On the other hand, high self-monitors may be more accustomed to dealing with 
external cues and as such they may have more realistic expectations with respect to such cues.  Future research may consider these differences in 
terms of perceptions of risk. 
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Table 3: Results of Hypotheses 
 
Panel A:  Hypothesis 1 (ANOVA) 
Independent Variable Option Mean Dependent Variable p-value 
Interest/enjoyment 
Yes 2.63 
Possibility of being discovered 0.000 
No 4.51 
Yes 2.96 Rules imposed by regulatory 
authorities 
0.017 
No 4.23 
Yes 2.93 
Rules imposed by profession 0.334 
No 3.43 
*Interest/enjoyment had two levels:  checked=1 (Yes); unchecked=0 (No) as indicated in the Option column. 
 
Panel B:  Hypothesis 2 (Regression) 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Mean t p-value 
Motivation to hack 
Possibility of being discovered 3.69 5.047 0.000 
Rules imposed by regulatory 
authorities 
3.68 5.376 0.000 
Rules imposed by profession 3.21 4.202 0.000 
 
Panel C:  Hypothesis 3 (ANOVA) 
Independent Variable Level Mean Dependent Variable p-value 
Self-monitor 
High 3.16 
Possibility of being discovered 0.002 
Low 5.12 
High 3.29 Rules imposed by regulatory 
authorities 
0.021 
Low 4.71 
High 2.58 
Rules imposed by profession 0.000 
Low 4.88 
 
Panel D:  Hypothesis 4 (Regression) 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Mean t p-value 
Internal cues 
Possibility of being discovered 3.69 3.022 0.004 
Rules imposed by regulatory 
authorities 
3.68 2.048 0.045 
Rules imposed by profession 3.21 0.914 0.364 
*The dependent variables were based on a 7-point Likert scale with 1=not at all and 7=to a great extent. 
 
 
Additional Analyzes 
 
 We conducted additional tests to provide additional insight into our findings.  Exhibit 2 shows the questions 
(taken from our research instrument) for additional analysis.  We examined the impact of the participants’ reasons for 
hacking on the effectiveness of various deterrence measures.  The results are presented in Table 4.  Participants who 
continued to hack for interest were found to be less discouraged by the possibility of being discovered (p=0.000) and 
by the rules imposed by regulatory authorities (p=0.017), and more discouraged by a ban on future access to systems 
(p=0.029).  Individuals who continued to hack for challenge were less discouraged by the rules imposed by regulatory 
authorities (p=0.021).  Those who continued to hack for curiosity were more discouraged by imprisonment (p=0.043) 
and a ban on future access to systems (p=0.021).  Participants who continued to hack for fun were more discouraged 
by imprisonment (p=0.009).  A ban on future access to systems precludes convicted computer criminals from future 
engagement in hacking.  Since individuals may perceive hacking to be interesting or challenging, they might be more 
devastated by a ban on future access to systems than by the consequences of discovery of the act or non-compliance 
with the rules imposed by regulatory authorities.  Individuals who hacked for recognition by the hacking community 
were less discouraged by publicity of their hacking activity (p=0.002) and their identity (p=0.000).  Those who hacked 
for financial incentives were less discouraged by the rules imposed by regulatory authorities (p=0.021) and the 
possibility of losing their job (p=0.000).  Individuals who hacked for prestige were less discouraged by publicity of 
their hacking activity (p=0.002).  Those who hacked to identify with the hacking community were less discouraged by 
a fine (p=0.000), censure by their profession (p=0.000), publicity of their hacking activity (p=0.002), and publicity of 
their identity (p=0.000).   
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Table 4: Impact of Reasons for Hacking on Effectiveness of Various Deterrence Measures 
 
Reasons for Hacking* Option Mean Various Deterrence Measures p-value 
Interest/enjoyment 
Yes 2.63 
Possibility of being discovered 0.000 
No 4.51 
Yes 2.96 
Rules imposed by regulatory authorities 0.017 
No 4.23 
Yes 0.59 
Ban on future access to systems 0.029 
No 0.31 
Challenge 
Yes 3.00 
Rules imposed by regulatory authorities 0.021 
No 4.24 
Curiosity 
Yes 0.65 
Imprisonment 0.043 
No 0.39 
Yes 0.58 
Ban on future access to systems 0.021 
No 0.29 
Fun 
Yes 0.70 
Imprisonment 0.009 
No 0.37 
Recognition by hacking 
community 
Yes 0.00 
Publicity of hacking activity 0.002 
No 0.16 
Yes 0.00 
Publicity of identity 0.000 
No 0.31 
Financial incentives 
Yes 2.75 
Rules imposed by regulatory authorities 0.021 
No 3.74 
Yes 0.00 
Loss of job 0.000 
No 0.38 
Prestige 
Yes 0.00 
Publicity of hacking activity 0.002 
No 0.16 
Identify with hacking 
community 
Yes 0.00 
Fine 0.000 
No 0.34 
Yes 0.00 
Censure by profession 0.000 
No 0.29 
Yes 0.00 
Publicity of hacking activity 0.002 
No 0.16 
Yes 0.00 
Publicity of identity 0.000 
No 0.31 
*Participants indicated their responses by checking all the applicable options for the following question:  Why do you continue to engage 
in hacking?  We coded the checked option as 1 (Yes) and the unchecked option as 0 (No).   
 
 
 We analyzed the demographic data to gain understanding on our participants’ reasons for hacking and the 
effectiveness of various deterrence measures.  The results are shown in Table 5.  Compared to females, males hacked 
more for the sake of interest (p=0.012).  Hacking enhanced the self-image of males more than that of females 
(p=0.011).  Females were more discouraged by the possibility of being discovered (p=0.002), the rules imposed by 
their profession (p=0.055), and censure by the IT community (p=0.053).  Compared to those aged 25
18
 or below, 
participants aged above 25 hacked more for the sake of challenge (p=0.032) and were less discouraged by publicity of 
their hacking activity (p=0.015).  A comparison of the two major cultural groups revealed that Caucasians hacked 
more for the sake of interest than Asians (p=0.015) and that they hacked more for desire to identify with the hacking 
community (p=0.021).  Caucasians also perceived hacking to be more consistent with their values (p=0.000) and 
beliefs (p=0.000).  Asians were more discouraged by the possibility of being discovered (p=0.000), and by the rules 
imposed by their profession (p=0.051) and regulatory authorities (p=0.000). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 The median was used to split the participants into two age groups. 
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Exhibit 2 
 
Reasons for Hacking 
Why do you continue to engage in hacking?  (Please check all applicable boxes)  
____ interest/enjoyment  
____ recognition of achievement by the hacking community  
____ challenge  
____ financial incentives  
____ prestige/status  
____ identification/association with the hacking community  
____ curiosity  
____ political motives  
____ fun  
____ others (please specify) 
 
Other Deterrence Measures 
What kinds of consequences would discourage you from hacking?  (Please check all applicable boxes) 
____ imprisonment  
____ fine  
____ censure by your profession  
____ censure by the IT community  
____ ban on future access to systems  
____ loss of job  
____ publicity of your hacking activity  
____ publicity of your identity  
____ others (please specify) 
 
*We coded the checked option as 1 and the unchecked option as 0. 
 
Table 5: Analysis of Demographics 
 
Demographics Group Mean 
Reasons for Hacking/ Various 
Deterrence Measures 
p-value 
Gender 
 
(46 males; 
16 females) 
Male 0.52 
Interest 0.012 
Female 0.19 
Male 2.78 
Image 0.011 
Female 1.88 
Male 3.17 
Possibility of being discovered 0.002 
Female 5.19 
Male 2.91 
Rules imposed by profession 0.055 
Female 4.06 
Male 0.15 
Censure by IT community 0.053 
Female 0.44 
Age (median=25; range=17 to 45) 
<= 25 0.31 
Challenge 0.032 
> 25 0.59 
<= 25 0.25 
Publicity of hacking activity 0.015 
> 25 0.03 
Ethnicity (2 major groups: 
44 Asians; 13 Caucasians) 
Asians 0.32 
Interest 0.015 
Caucasians 0.69 
Asians 1.89 
Identify with hacking community 0.021 
Caucasians 3.54 
Asians 2.86 
Values 0.000 
Caucasians 5.31 
Asians 2.70 
Beliefs 0.000 
Caucasians 5.38 
Asians 4.18 
Possibility of being discovered 0.000 
Caucasians 2.08 
Asians 3.50 
Rules imposed by profession 0.051 
Caucasians 2.31 
Asians 4.25 Rules imposed by regulatory 
authorities 
0.000 
Caucasians 1.92 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Implications 
 
 Systems security is an important issue that has received considerable attention as a result of the increasing 
number of attacks on information systems.  Despite the importance of this issue, very little empirical research is 
available for promoting understanding on the hacking behavior and the effectiveness of deterrence measures in 
discouraging hacking.  The source of the problem (i.e., the underlying behaviors of hackers) should be understood 
before effective measures can be implemented to mitigate this problem.  In this respect, our study makes a significant 
contribution to the systems security literature in that we use addiction, intrinsic motivation, and self-monitoring 
theories to provide valuable insight into the behaviors of hackers.  Using addiction theory as a framework, we 
examine hacking both as a state and trait.  Our findings suggest that it is difficult to discourage an intrinsically 
motivated behavior such as hacking.  Indeed, one hacker stated that only death would stop him from hacking.  We 
found that individuals who hacked for the sake of interest/enjoyment were less discouraged by the possibility of being 
discovered and the rules imposed by regulatory authorities; however, we did not find any significant result for rules 
imposed by the profession.  Interestingly, we found that those with a high motivation to hack were less discouraged by 
all three deterrence measures.  Since the perception of hacking scale consists of four components (i.e., interest, 
importance, utility, and opportunity cost), the motivation to hack construct may be a more comprehensive measure for 
assessing the effectiveness of the deterrence measures in discouraging hacking.  Contrary to the predictions of self-
monitoring theory, we found that relative to the high self-monitors, low self-monitors were more discouraged by all 
three deterrence measures.  We use the internal cues construct to provide additional insight into this finding.  Our 
results suggested that individuals who perceived hacking to be more consistent with their underlying values, beliefs, 
and self-image were less discouraged by the possibility of being discovered and the rules imposed by regulatory 
authorities; no significant result was reported for rules imposed by the profession.  Further, we found that the self-
monitoring scale was weakly correlated with the internal cues construct (i.e., values, beliefs, and self-image).   
 
 The results of our study may help clear some of the misconceptions that a layperson might have about 
hackers and hacking.  The negative connotation that the general public attaches to hackers may have an impact on the 
severity of punishment imposed by the judicial system.  The hacking community may also challenge any uniform 
punishment meted out to hackers.  Since intrinsically motivated individuals hack for the sake of interest/enjoyment, 
they may not harbor malicious intentions to harm any individual, system, or organization.  Indeed, firms can consider 
assimilating these individuals into their systems security control teams to help combat security breaches.  However, 
perpetrators who hack for malicious intentions should be punished and the severity of such punishment should be a 
function of the hackers’ malicious intentions and the extent of damage or harm caused to the target.   
 
Limitations 
 
 Our sample may comprise primarily hackers who perceived hacking as an intrinsically motivating activity.  
Although we believe that hacking is an intrinsically motivated behavior, our sample may not be representative of the 
entire hacking population.  However, we did not have control over the participants self-selecting themselves into our 
study.  Only four participants indicated that they hacked for prestige or financial incentives
19
, or to identify with or to 
have their achievements recognized by the hacking community.  One individual indicated that he hacked for political 
motives.  Since these reasons are extrinsic in nature, there is evidence that some individuals may hack because of their 
extrinsic motivation
20
.  A sample of four is too small for any meaningful examination of the behavior of extrinsically 
motivated individuals; however, this opens up an avenue for future research. 
 
 
                                                 
19 For example, a group of hackers stole one million credit card numbers over the Internet, revealed the break-in, posted the credit card numbers on 
the Internet, and offered to provide “security” services for a fee (Wallace 2001).  In another instance, a Russian hacker stole more than 55,000 credit 
cards from creditcards.com (a website that processes transactions for online merchants) and posted about 25,000 credit card numbers online when 
his demand for $100,000 was ignored (Hopper 2001).   
20 Extrinsic motivation is defined as a person’s “orientation toward money, recognition, competition, and the dictates of others” (Amabile et al. 
1994, p. 951).   
The Review of Business Information Systems – Fall 2005                                                             Volume 9, Number 4 
 56 
Future Research 
 Our predictions about the behavior of hackers based on self-monitoring theory are opposite to what we have 
expected.  One potential explanation could be the unique nature of our sample.  Future work can provide insight into 
this contradictory finding.  In addition, the general public’s misconceptions about hackers and hacking can be 
attributed to failure in recognizing the behavioral differences among different groups of hackers.  One hacker 
categorized hackers into five groups:  “young and stupid”, “coders”, “anarchist”, “security professionals”, and “elite”.  
This person felt that the “young and stupid” group caused the most problem because they did not understand the 
implications and costs associated with their activity.  He indicated that “coders” write codes to prove to a non-
technical person that anything is possible and that “anarchists” believe that all information should be free.  He stated 
that “security professionals” create a self-sustaining need for themselves by releasing vulnerabilities to the hacking 
community.  The “elite” group reflects the lifestyle of the hacking underground. 
 
 Additional research is needed to help firms determine whether they should hire former hackers or individuals 
who claim that they are reformed.  Firms might consider hiring a white hat or reformed hacker.  Finally, future 
research can help identify individuals who hack because of extrinsic motivation, and provide insight into whether 
deterrence measures such as the possibility of being discovered and the rules imposed by regulatory authorities or by 
the profession, or other penalties would discourage extrinsically motivated individuals from hacking. 
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